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Whither (Wither?) the Unfinished Business 
Doctrine 
Douglas R. Richmond* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Large law firms collapse with alarming frequency. In recent 
years, for example, Altheimer & Gray LLP; Brobeck, Phleger 
& Harrison LLP; Coudert Brothers LLP; Dewey & LeBoeuf 
LLP; Heller Ehrman LLP; Howrey LLP; Thacher Proffitt & Wood 
LLP; Thelen LLP; and Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen LLP 
have folded. These high profile failures amply demonstrate the 
extraordinary fragility of law firm partnerships.1 
Law firm failures may be rooted in competitive pressures, 
destabilizing internal dynamics, governance or leadership 
failures, unsatisfactory or unsettling financial prospects or 
performance, or some toxic combination thereof.2 These issues 
drive major rainmaking partners to leave the firm, often taking 
groups of productive lawyers with them. One key partner 
departure leads to another and another, producing a 
“self-reinforcing spiral of withdrawal” akin to a Depression-era 
run on a bank.3 A law firm caught in such a “partner run” seldom 
survives.4 Indeed, a firm may go from apparent financial health 
to dissolution in a few months, and perhaps in even less time.5 
Dissolving law firms typically have scores of open client 
matters, many of which are far from completion. Litigation 
matters may take years to conclude.6 Departing partners who 
 
 * Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Overland Park, Kansas. J.D., 
University of Kansas. Views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not 
reflect the views of any Aon entity or client. 
 1 See John Morley, Why Law Firms Collapse 1–2 (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper 
No. 521, 2015) (arguing that law firms are “uniquely fragile” and “are made of thin glass”). 
 2 See Edward S. Adams, Lessons from Law Firm Bankruptcies and Proposals for 
Reform, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 507, 509–10 (2015) (exploring select major law firm 
bankruptcies as a means of identifying common elements in their failures, including 
economic turmoil, excessive growth and overcompensation, and toxic firm culture 
and governance). 
 3 Morley, supra note 1, at 2. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 1–2. 
 6 ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 4.6.1, at 4:63–64 (2d ed. 2016).  
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intend to continue practicing law often expect to take open client 
matters with them to new firms. The law firms to which the 
partners of the dissolved firm relocate are often vitally interested 
in the dissolved firm’s active clients coming along. 
At the same time, the dissolving law firm has landlords, 
lenders, and other creditors to pay. The firm may have financial 
obligations to retired partners. Pending client matters may be a 
dissolving law firm’s only significant assets.7 If the law firm has 
filed for bankruptcy protection, creditors and any trustee that is 
appointed will strive to derive value from those assets for the 
benefit of the bankruptcy estate.8 The result is frequently 
litigation, in which a bankruptcy trustee or other administrator 
sues the departing partners and the law firms to which they 
relocate to collect fees earned on the dissolving firm’s “unfinished 
business.”9 Unfinished business consists of “all matters in 
progress which have not been completed at the time the firm 
is dissolved.”10 
The “unfinished business” doctrine reflects established 
partnership law.11 In the law firm world, the unfinished business 
doctrine is frequently referred to as the Jewel doctrine, or the 
Jewel rule, after the seminal California case on the subject, Jewel 
v. Boxer.12 Regardless of how it is described, the unfinished 
business doctrine essentially holds that absent contrary 
agreement, partners in a dissolved law firm must account to the 
firm and its former partners either for all fees generated from 
work in progress at the time of the firm’s dissolution, or for the 
profits made on that work (depending on the state’s partnership 
 
 7 Christine Hurt, The Limited Liability Partnership in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 567, 571 (2015). 
 8 See id. (“Though the partners of a law firm may have incentives to allow for easy 
exit of themselves and other partners . . . trustees have incentives to retain those assets. 
The larger the debt of the distressed firm, the more incentive the trustee has to assert 
claims against financially well-off third party law firms that reaped the benefit of hourly 
work for former clients of the debtor.”). 
 9 See John W. Edson, Comment, An Unworkable Result: Examining the Application 
of the Unfinished Business Doctrine to Law Firm Bankruptcies, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 
159, 161 (2015) (explaining that “trustees argue that any post-dissolution work derived 
from client business started at the bankrupt firm is property of the bankrupt 
firm’s estate”). 
 10 Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
 11 Douglas R. Richmond, Migratory Law Partners and the Glue of Unfinished 
Business, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 360, 420 (2012); see also Scott Fleischer, The “Unfinished 
Business” Doctrine in Law Firm Bankruptcies, NASSAU LAWYER, Dec. 2014, at 7 (“The 
‘unfinished business’ doctrine is not just rooted in one particular section of the UPA or 
RUPA, but was developed through collective interpretations of many sections.”). 
 12 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). A thorough discussion of Jewel and its 
progeny is beyond the scope of this article. For such a discussion, see Richmond, supra 11, 
at 370–87. 
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law) in accordance with their percentage interests in the firm.13 
Pending client matters are uncompleted transactions that 
require winding up after dissolution, and are therefore 
partnership assets subject to post-dissolution distribution.14 As 
the court in Gull v. Van Epps15 explained, “all partners of the 
dissolved firm are generally entitled to share in fees for 
pre-dissolution work in progress earned after dissolution, even if 
the client has exercised [its] right to discharge the attorney or 
attorneys who are sharing in the fees.”16 This entitlement exists 
because dissolution does not terminate the firm’s pre-existing 
contracts with its clients, so that partners who perform those 
contracts do so as fiduciaries for the benefit of the 
dissolved partnership.17 
If partners of a dissolving law partnership stayed together 
during the wind up of the firm’s business, the unfinished 
business doctrine would be of no moment. But they do not—they 
scatter to new law firms, taking open client matters with them. 
The work they or their colleagues perform on those matters at 
their new firms produces fees that their new firms wish to collect 
and retain, and which they do not want to share with, or 
surrender to, the dissolved firm. As noted earlier, this leaves an 
administrator or trustee of the dissolved firm or its bankruptcy 
estate to negotiate or sue for those fees under the unfinished 
business doctrine. In this way the unfinished business doctrine 
substitutes for the orderly winding up of partnership affairs by 
the partners of the dissolved partnership.18 
 
 13 As explained in Part II, under the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”), a partner, 
other than a surviving partner, is not entitled to compensation for her services in winding 
up the dissolved partnership’s affairs other than any sums she will receive for her share 
in the partnership. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (1914). Jewel was decided under 
California’s version of the UPA. California later adopted the Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act (“RUPA”). Most other states follow RUPA. Under RUPA, the unfinished business 
doctrine has been modified to permit former partners to deduct overhead and reasonable 
compensation before remitting to the dissolved partnership any monies earned from 
completing unfinished business. See Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In 
re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 326 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(explaining California partnership law, which changed after Jewel was decided). This 
allowance of compensation beyond any sums the former partner would receive for her 
partnership share is often described as “extra compensation” or as “reasonable compensation,” 
with the latter term being more accurate. Id. at 326 n.4. 
 14 See Young v. Delaney, 647 A.2d 784, 789 (D.C. 1994); Beckman v. Farmer, 579 
A.2d 618, 636 (D.C. 1990). 
 15 Gull v. Van Epps, 517 N.W.2d 531 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
 16 Id. at 536. 
 17 See In re LaBrum & Doak, LLP v. Ashdale, 227 B.R. 391, 409 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1998); Beckman, 579 A.2d at 636; Huber v. Etkin, 58 A.3d 772, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
 18 Courts have also applied the unfinished doctrine to dissolving law firms organized 
as limited liability companies (“LLC”), professional associations, and professional 
corporations. See, e.g., Vowell & Meelheim, P.C. v. Beddow, Erben & Bowen, P.A., 679 So. 
2d 637, 640 (Ala. 1996) (involving a firm organized as a professional association); 
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When a large law firm dissolves, many of the open client 
matters are billed by the hour. Despite increases in the use of 
alternative fee structures, most lawyers in large law firms bill 
hourly.19 Because the Jewel court upheld the unfinished business 
doctrine in connection with contingent fees,20 partners in 
dissolved large law firms resisting unfinished business claims 
have frequently argued that courts should confine the doctrine to 
contingent fee cases and should not apply it to hourly matters.21 
For years that argument failed,22 as should have been expected, 
because the Jewel court did not confine its holding to contingent 
fee matters.23 Certainly, the unfinished business doctrine applies 
to contingent fee cases24—but as a matter of partnership law it 
should apply to other compensation arrangements, including 
matters billed by the hour.25 Partnership law provides no basis 
for treating client matters billed hourly as anything other than 
the unfinished business of a dissolved law partnership. Indeed, 
since Jewel was decided, California courts have applied the 
 
Grossman v. Davis, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the 
unfinished business doctrine applies to professional corporations); LaFond v. Sweeney, 
343 P.3d 939, 945–49 (Colo. 2015) (applying the unfinished business doctrine in a case 
involving a law firm organized as an LLC); Sullivan, Bodney & Hammond v. Bodney, 820 
P.2d 1248, 1250 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (observing that the policy reasons supporting the 
rule in Jewel applied to the dissolution of a professional corporation). 
 19 See Lucy Muzzy, Maximizing the Value of Outside Counsel, FED. LAW., Sept. 2013, 
at 56, 58 (reporting that large law firms continue to earn approximately eighty percent of 
their revenue from hourly billing).  
 20 Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 21 See, e.g., Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 572–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(recognizing, but ultimately rejecting, the argument that Jewel and its progeny apply only 
to contingent fee cases and not to hourly fee matters). 
 22 See, e.g., Robinson v. Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–5 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing and 
discussing Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618, 641 (D.C. 1990)); Grossman, 34 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 356 (explaining that the unfinished business doctrine applies regardless of “the 
nature of the compensation agreement with the client”); Rothman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
572–73 (“Neither Jewel nor [another case] explicitly states that it is concerned solely with 
contingency fee cases . . . . Moreover, the policy reasons for the rule announced in Jewel . . 
. apply with equal force to both contingency and hourly rate cases.”); see also Thomas E. 
Rutledge & Tara A. McGuire, Conflicting Views as to the Unfinished Business Doctrine, 
BUS. LAW TODAY, Feb. 2015, at 1 (observing that most courts and commentators have 
applied the unfinished business doctrine to hourly matters as well as to contingent 
fee cases). 
 23 Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 18–20. 
 24 See, e.g., LaFond v. Sweeney, 343 P.3d 939, 944–49 (Colo. 2015) (applying the 
unfinished business doctrine to a contingent fee matter in the dissolution of a law firm 
organized as an LLC); Huber v. Etkin, 58 A.3d 772, 780 (Pa. Super. 2012) (concluding that 
“contingency fees realized post-dissolution are assets of the partnership”).  
 25 See Peter W. Rogers, Note, Who Gets the Jewels When a Law Firm Dissolves? The 
Unfinished Business Doctrine and Hourly Matters, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 311, 336 (2013) 
(“Because the unfinished business doctrine is a function of partnership law that upholds 
fiduciary duties as a partnership winds up, the doctrine does not clash with . . . the UPA, 
or RUPA, whether it is applied to matters billed by the hour or on contingency.”). 
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unfinished business doctrine to matters billed by the hour,26 as 
have courts in other jurisdictions.27  
In 2014, however, two decisions from courts on opposite 
coasts radically altered the unfinished business landscape by 
rejecting its application to client matters that are billed by the 
hour. The New York Court of Appeals held in Geron v. Seyfarth 
Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)28 that “pending hourly fee matters 
are not ‘partnership property’ or ‘unfinished business’ within the 
meaning of New York’s Partnership Law.”29 In re Thelen came to 
the court on certified questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit30 after two Southern District of New York 
courts predicting New York law reached opposite conclusions on 
the unfinished business doctrine’s application to hourly matters 
in cases arising out of separate large law firm bankruptcies.31 
In Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP,32 a 
California federal court reasoned that California law was 
“unsettled on the question of whether a law firm may assert a 
property interest in hourly fee matters pending at the time of its 
dissolution,”33 and went on to hold that equity and public policy 
weighed against application of the unfinished business doctrine 
in that context.34 The trustee of the bankrupt law firm appealed 
that decision to the Ninth Circuit, which in July 2016 certified 
this question to the California Supreme Court: “Under California 
law, does a dissolved law firm have a property interest in legal 
matters that are in progress but not completed at the time the 
law firm is dissolved, when the dissolved law firm had been 
 
 26 See, e.g., Rothman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573 (“[W]e hold that unfinished business 
simply consists of all matters in progress which have not been completed at the time the 
firm is dissolved. . . . That one matter is to be compensated at an hourly rate and another 
on a contingency basis is of no consequence in determining whether a matter is 
unfinished business.”) (citation omitted). 
 27 See, e.g., Robinson, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 4–6 (applying District of Columbia law).  
 28 See Geron v. Seyfarth (In re Thelen LLP), 20 N.E.3d 264 (N.Y. 2014). 
 29 Id. at 266–67. 
 30 Geron v. Seyfarth (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 225 (2d Cir. 2013) (certifying 
questions in a case arising out of the Thelen LLP bankruptcy); In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 
Nos. 12-4916(L) et al., 2013 WL 9363394, at *1–2 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2013) (certifying 
questions in a case arising out of the Coudert Brothers LLP bankruptcy). 
 31 Compare Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 480 
B.R. 145, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (concluding “that the New York Court of Appeals would, if 
confronted with the issue, conclude that all client matters pending on the date of 
dissolution are assets of the firm—regardless of how the firm was to be compensated for 
the work”), rev’d in part, vacated in part by In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 574 F. App’x 15, 16 
(2d Cir. 2014), with Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(concluding that “under New York law, a dissolved law firm's pending hourly fee matters 
are not partnership assets”). 
 32 See Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014). 
 33 Id. at 30. 
 34 Id. at 30–33. 
Do Not Delete 6/20/17 7:13 PM 
288 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 20:2 
retained to handle the matters on an hourly basis?”35 The 
California Supreme Court accepted the case and restated the 
certified question as follows: “Under California law, what 
interest, if any, does a dissolved law firm have in legal matters 
that are in progress but not completed at the time the law firm is 
dissolved, when the dissolved law firm had been retained to 
handle the matter on an hourly basis?”36 The California Supreme 
Court’s decision will determine the outcome in Heller Ehrman.37 
This Article explains why In re Thelen and Heller Ehrman 
were wrongly decided. To be sure, the unfinished business 
doctrine sometimes produces results that lawyers find maddening. 
The doctrine’s effects are particularly severe in Uniform 
Partnership Act jurisdictions, as will be explained in the next 
Part of this article. At a minimum, the doctrine potentially 
complicates partners’ relocation from failed law firms to new 
firms. But whatever its perceived flaws, the unfinished business 
doctrine is an established aspect of partnership law that law 
firms can contract around by inserting Jewel waivers in their 
partnership agreements. The arguments that some commentators, 
lawyers, and law firms have mounted against the doctrine to 
date are unpersuasive. There is no compelling reason to except 
law firms from the operation of a partnership law doctrine to 
which all other partnerships are subject. 
In explaining why the unfinished business doctrine should 
be applied to matters billed by the hour, as it does to 
representations in which lawyers are compensated by other 
methods, we begin in Part II with a discussion of partnership law 
principles.38 This includes an overview of partnership dissolution, 
winding up, and termination, as well as an examination of 
partners’ fiduciary duties post-dissolution. Part III analyzes In re 
Thelen and Heller Ehrman in detail and explains why they are 
incorrectly decided. Finally, Part IV dissects some of the leading 
arguments that law firms have made in opposing the unfinished 
business doctrine’s application. 
 
 35 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP (In re Heller Ehrman LLP), 
830 F.3d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 36 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, No. S236208, 2016 Cal. 
LEXIS 7131, at *1 (Cal. Aug. 31, 2016).  
 37 In re Heller Ehrman LLP, 830 F.3d at 973. 
 38 See generally Richmond, supra note 11, at 365–69, which was adapted for Parts 
II.A and II.B. All text has been updated and remains the author’s original work.  
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION, WINDING UP, 
AND TERMINATION 
Partnerships are voluntary associations.39 They are also 
creatures of contract.40 The relationships between partners and 
their firm are generally governed by the terms of the partnership 
agreement.41 A partnership agreement may be oral or written,42 
and may also be inferred from parties’ conduct,43 although there 
is obvious potential for confusion and uncertainty if the 
agreement is not in writing. If there is no partnership agreement 
or the agreement is silent on an issue, state partnership statutes 
control.44 In other words, state partnership statutes primarily 
provide default rules.45 Regardless, any partnership may 
dissolve; there is no such thing as an “indissoluble partnership.”46 
A. Understanding Dissolution, Winding Up, and Termination 
The Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 (“UPA”), long the 
foundation for many states’ partnership laws and still employed 
in some states, treats partnerships as aggregates of their 
members rather than as distinct entities.47 The UPA defines 
“dissolution” as “the change in the relation of the partners caused 
by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on . . . of 
the business.”48 Under the UPA approach, a partnership 
dissolves any time a partner permanently leaves the firm, even if 
the firm outwardly appears to continue.49 Again, this is a default 
rule.50 Law firm partnerships in UPA states may avoid this 
result by including in their partnership agreements (a) a 
 
 39 Loft v. Lapidus, 936 F.2d 633, 636 (1st Cir. 1991); Bunger v. Demming, 40 N.E.3d 
887, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); Casey v. Chapman, 98 P.3d 1246, 1252 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 40 Husch & Eppenberger, v. Eisenberg, 213 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).  
 41 See LESLIE D. CORWIN & ARTHUR J. CIAMPI, LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS 
§ 1.05, at 1–30 (2008). 
 42 Legacy Seating v. Commercial Plastics, 65 F. Supp. 3d 542, 551–52 (N.D. Ill. 2014) 
(applying Illinois law); Young v. Delaney, 647 A.2d 784, 789 (D.C. 1994). 
 43 Cressy v. Proctor, 22 F. Supp. 3d 353, 360 (D. Vt. 2014) (discussing Vermont law). 
 44 See CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 41, § 1.05, at 1–30. 
 45 Husch & Eppenberger, 213 S.W.3d at 132; McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697, 703 
(Mont. 2004); Ederer v. Gursky, 881 N.E.2d 204, 212 (N.Y. 2007); Bushard v. Reisman, 
800 N.W.2d 373, 380 (Wis. 2011). 
 46 Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Ky. 2006); Urbane v. Beierling, 835 
N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). 
 47 See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 279 (3rd ed. 2001). 
 48 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 29 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1914). 
 49 HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.3.3, at 4:24. The remaining partners may choose to 
continue the partnership business following the withdrawal of their peer. If so, “the old 
firm continues until its affairs are wound up and a new partnership is formed, consisting 
of the remaining members of the old partnership.” See also 8182 Md. Assocs., Ltd. P’ship 
v. Sheehan, 14 S.W.3d 576, 580–81 (Mo. 2000). Any creditors of the old partnership 
become creditors of the new partnership. Id. (citing a Missouri statute). 
 50 In re Popkin & Stern, 340 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying Missouri law). 
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provision setting the term of the partnership;51 or (b) an 
“anti-dissolution” or “continuation” provision differentiating 
withdrawal from dissolution and recognizing the latter only upon 
a partnership vote.52 The second of these options is common, 
although its effectiveness is questionable, because “the inherent 
power of any partner to dissolve a partnership, even in 
contravention of an agreement, is a central tenet of the UPA.”53 
In any event, a partnership agreement may include both types 
of provisions.54 
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”),55 which has 
now been adopted in most states, differs from the UPA in several 
key respects relevant to dissolution. RUPA establishes that a 
partnership is an entity separate from its constituent partners.56 
Like the UPA, RUPA grants partners the right to withdraw from 
their partnerships at any time.57 Unlike the UPA, however, 
under RUPA, a partner’s withdrawal does not necessarily cause 
the partnership’s dissolution.58 RUPA distinguishes between 
dissolution and withdrawal through the use of the term 
“dissociation,” which denotes a partner’s withdrawal from a 
partnership, whether voluntary or involuntary.59 
 
 51 HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.3.2.2, at 4:18. A provision in a partnership agreement 
specifying a term of partnership does not actually prevent a partner from withdrawing 
prematurely and thus causing the firm to dissolve. But such a premature dissolution is 
considered wrongful, and the remaining partners may avoid winding up and continue the 
business uninterrupted. Id. § 4.3.2.2, at 4:19. 
 52 Id. § 4.3.2.3, at 4:19. 
 53 Id. § 4.3.2.3, at 4:20–22 (footnote omitted); see also Eskenazi v. Schapiro, 812 
N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (App. Div. 2006) (discussing joint venturers’ and partners’ abilities to 
repudiate a joint venture or partnership agreement at any time under the New York 
Partnership Law). 
 54 See, e.g., In re Popkin & Stern, 340 F.3d at 711 (quoting the law firm’s 
partnership agreement).  
 55 There is no official “Revised Uniform Partnership Act.” The National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform Laws revised the UPA in 1994 and again in 1996, with the 
1996 revisions subsequently published bearing a 1997 date. The 1994 and subsequent 
revisions to the UPA came to be known as the “Revised Uniform Partnership Act.” 
HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.1, at 4:2–3. The official name for what most lawyers call 
RUPA is the “Uniform Partnership Act (1997).” GREGORY, supra note 47, at 262. To avoid 
confusion, some courts refer to their states’ partnership acts by revision date. See, e.g., 
Faegre & Benson, LLP v. R & R Inv’rs, 772 N.W.2d 846, 852–53 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) 
(referring to “the 1994 UPA”). 
 56 ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201(a) 
(2015–16 ed.) [hereinafter HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT] (“A partnership is 
an entity distinct from its partners.”).  
 57 Compare UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(1)(b)(2) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 1914) (discussing dissolutions caused both permissibly and wrongfully), with 
HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 56, at § 602(a) (“A partner has the 
power to dissociate at any time, rightfully or wrongfully, by express will . . . .”). 
 58 HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.4.2, at 4:46. 
 59 Id.  
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Under both the UPA and RUPA, dissolution does not halt 
partnership operations.60 Dissolution does not terminate the 
partnership.61 “Dissolution” and “termination” are not 
synonymous.62 Rather, the dissolved partnership enters a winding 
up phase.63 “Winding up” is the time after dissolution and before 
termination during which all partnership affairs are settled.64 
Winding up a partnership generally “involves reducing the assets 
to cash (liquidation), paying creditors, and distributing to 
partners the value of their respective interests.”65 Winding up 
may also include the prosecution of legal claims belonging to the 
partnership.66 A law firm that is winding up will have to notify 
its clients and perhaps withdraw from representations, and may 
further be required to assist clients in securing new counsel. 
Regardless of the specific tasks involved, winding up is a 
dissolved partnership’s sole business or purpose.67 
When the partnership is a large law firm, dissolution and 
winding up are usually accomplished pursuant to a formal plan 
of dissolution, and a firm may engage outside professionals, such 
as accountants and lawyers, to assist it in winding up.68 There is 
no prescribed time within which winding up must be 
accomplished,69 although it should be completed within a 
 
 60 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 30 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1914) 
(“On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of 
partnership affairs is completed.”); HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 
56, § 802(a) (providing that after dissolution, a partnership continues for the sole purpose 
of winding up its affairs and that the partnership is terminated when winding up 
is completed). 
 61 Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890, 897 (Alaska 2004); Chaney v. Burdett, 560 
S.E.2d 21, 22 (Ga. 2002); Hyta v. Finley, 53 P.3d 338, 340 (Idaho 2002); Lai v. Gartlan, 
845 N.Y.S.2d 30, 36 (App. Div. 2007); Huber v. Etkin, 58 A.3d 772, 777 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2012).  
 62 Gast v. Peters, 671 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Neb. 2003); see also Scholastic, Inc. v. Harris, 
259 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing New York law and stating that “[d]issolution is 
not termination”); 8182 Md. Assocs., Ltd. P’ship v. Sheehan, 14 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Mo. 
2000) (“Dissolution, however, is not a termination of the partnership business.”). 
 63 Hyta, 53 P.3d at 340; Hurwitz v. Padden, 581 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1998); Lai, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 36. 
 64 GREGORY, supra note 47, § 227.  
 65 Estate of Matteson v. Matteson, 749 N.W.2d 557, 567 (Wis. 2008) (quoting First 
Nat’l Bank of Kenosha v. Schaefer, 283 N.W.2d 410, 418 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979)); see also 
Hyta, 53 P.3d at 340 (similarly describing the winding up process).  
 66 Faegre & Benson, LLP v. R & R Inv’rs, 772 N.W.2d 846, 853 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2009).  
 67 In re Jones & McClain, LLP, 271 B.R. 473, 478 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001); Fischer v. 
Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Ky. 2006) (quoting the official commentary to the UPA); 
Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. Ward & Olivo, L.L.P., 139 A.3d 30, 38 (N.J. 2016). 
 68 See CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 41, § 7.05[4], at 7–23 (offering a sample plan of 
dissolution which, among its terms, provides for the retention of professionals to assist in 
the winding up process). 
 69 Centerre Bank of Kan. City, N.A. v. Angle, 976 S.W.2d 608, 618 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1998). 
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reasonable time.70 Law firm wind-ups may drag on because they 
involve bringing to a close all matters pending at the time of 
dissolution, and litigation matters may take months and even 
years to resolve.71 However long winding up may take, the 
partnership terminates only when the process is complete.72 
The UPA and RUPA take quite different approaches to 
compensating partners for time spent completing a dissolved 
partnership’s unfinished business. Under the UPA, a partner, 
other than a surviving partner,73 is entitled to no extra 
compensation for her services in winding up the dissolved 
partnership’s affairs.74 “Extra compensation” refers to compensation 
greater than any sum the partner will receive as her share of the 
partnership.75 The refusal to allow extra compensation is sometimes 
described as the “no compensation rule.”76 In contrast, under RUPA, 
partners are entitled to reasonable compensation for their services 
in winding up the dissolved partnership, plus the reimbursement of 
related overhead.77 
Law firms that do not want their partners to confront the 
unfinished business doctrine in the event the firm dissolves may 
avoid that prospect by including so-called “Jewel waivers” in 
 
 70 Daniels Trucking, Inc. v. Rogers, 643 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Doting 
v. Trunk, 856 P.2d 536, 542 (Mont. 1993). 
 71 See Robert W. Hillman, Law Firm Risk Management in an Era of Breakups and 
Lawyer Mobility: Limitations and Opportunities, 43 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 449, 465 (2011).  
 72 Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385, 391 (Md. 1999); Hurwitz v. Padden, 581 N.W.2d 359, 
361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Gast v. Peters, 671 N.W.2d 758, 762–63 (Neb. 2003).  
 73 The term “surviving partner” as used in the UPA refers to “those partners who 
have survived another partner’s death.” Bushard v. Reisman, 800 N.W.2d 373, 381 
(Wis. 2011).  
 74 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1914) 
(“No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business, except 
that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in winding 
up the partnership affairs.”); see, e.g., Kahn v. Seely, 980 S.W.2d 794, 798–99 (Tex. App. 
1998) (applying Texas version of UPA and denying former partner extra compensation for 
winding up dissolved partnership’s affairs). 
 75 Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 n.2 (Ct. App. 1984). Under the UPA, partners 
are entitled to reimbursement for reasonable overhead expenses they incur in completing 
the dissolved firm’s unfinished business. Id. at 19. Unfortunately, courts do not agree on 
how to calculate reasonable overhead expenses for which a partner may seek 
reimbursement. Hammes v. Frank, 579 N.E.2d 1348, 1353 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Under 
one formulation, “overhead” refers to a lawyer’s direct costs, i.e. those costs that can be 
specifically attributed to a matter without apportionment. See id. The other possibility is 
to include within the definition of overhead indirect costs that cannot be allocated to a 
particular case or matter, such as rent, library expenses, staff salaries, utilities, and so 
on. See id. (noting the competing approaches).  
 76 See, e.g., LaFond v. Sweeney, 343 P.3d 939, 943–44 (Colo. 2015) (deciding whether 
to apply the no compensation rule in the dissolution of a law firm organized as an LLC).  
 77 Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger 
& Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 326 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (discussing California 
partnership law); HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 56, § 401(h). 
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their partnership agreements.78 A Jewel waiver is intended to 
ensure that the partnership has no property interest in client 
matters at the time of dissolution so that departing lawyers may 
take open matters with them without having to account for fees 
earned on them post-dissolution.79 Although a Jewel waiver 
should override the default rules of state partnership laws, to be 
effective, it must be adopted at a time when it will not be exposed 
to challenge in bankruptcy as a fraudulent conveyance or 
transfer of partnership assets.80 
B. Partners’ Fiduciary Duties Post-Dissolution 
Partnership is a fiduciary relation, and partners owe 
fiduciary duties to one another and to their firms.81 Dissolution 
alters partners’ fiduciary duties in some respects, but it does not 
entirely extinguish them. Specifically, dissolution erases a 
partner’s loyalty obligation not to compete with the partnership 
in the conduct of partnership business.82 A partner therefore may 
compete with her former colleagues and dissolved law firm for 
new business, even if that new business comes from clients that 
were clients of the firm when it dissolved.83 In all other respects, 
however, partners’ fiduciary duties continue through the winding 
up phase.84 Termination of the partnership terminates the 
partners’ fiduciary duties.85 
 
 78 See Rachel M. Arnett, Ripping the Jackson Pollock Off the Wall: Reconciling Jewel 
v. Boxer with the Modern Law Firm, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 557, 562 (2013) (“A 
partnership can opt out of the unfinished business rule by including a Jewel waiver in its 
partnership agreement. The effect is simple: partners no longer have any financial 
obligations to the partnership with regard to fees collected as part of the winding-up 
phase.”) (footnote omitted). 
 79 Hurt, supra note 7, at 577–78; Michael D. DeBaecke & Victoria Guilfoyle, Law 
Firm Dissolutions: When the Music Stops, Does Anyone Need to Account for Any 
Unfinished Business?, 14 DEL. L. REV. 41, 66 (2013). 
 80 See, e.g., In re Brobeck, 408 B.R. at 336–47 (involving claims by a dissolved law 
firm’s bankruptcy trustee that the firm’s Jewel waiver gave rise to fraudulent conveyances).  
 81 In re Rueth Dev. Co., 976 N.E.2d 42, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); RAS AAP, LLC 
v. Alyeska Ocean, Inc., 358 P.3d 483, 490 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). 
 82 HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 56, § 404(b)(3) (restricting 
a partner’s duty of loyalty “to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct 
of partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership”) (emphasis added). 
 83 Smith, Keller & Assocs. v. Dorr & Assocs., 875 P.2d 1258, 1267 (Wyo. 1994) 
(quoting Fraser v. Bogucki, 250 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (Ct. App. 1988)).  
 84 See Tucker v. Ellbogen, 793 P.2d 592, 597 (Colo. App. 1989) (“After the dissolution 
of a partnership, each partner continues to have a fiduciary duty to the other partner 
until the partnership assets have been divided and the liabilities have been satisfied.”); 
Ruse v. Bleeke, 914 N.E.2d 1, 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Partners owe a fiduciary duty to 
one another that continues until final termination of the business of the partnership.”); 
Miami Subs Corp. v. Murray Family Tr., 703 A.2d 1366, 1374 (N.H. 1997) (stating that 
fiduciary duties continue through winding up and until termination); Huber v. Etkin, 58 
A.3d 772, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (stating that partners’ fiduciary duties continue 
through winding up); M.R. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell, 904 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1995) 
(stating that partners owe each other and their partnership a fiduciary duty in the 
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In some jurisdictions, the continuation of fiduciary duties 
may be statutorily prescribed. Under RUPA, for example, 
partners’ duties to account and to refrain from dealing with the 
partnership on behalf of a party having an adverse interest 
expressly continue through wind up.86 The duty of good faith and 
fair dealing set forth in RUPA section 404(d) has no durational 
limit, and therefore should be understood to continue through the 
winding up phase.87 Included among partners’ post-dissolution 
duties that continue during the winding-up phase is the duty to 
complete the partnership’s unfinished business.88 The failure to 
discharge this duty is actionable and is ordinarily remedied by a 
monetary damage award that can be credited in an accounting.89 
It is possible to breach this duty by requiring another partner to 
bear a disproportionate burden of unfinished business to complete.90 
III. IN RE THELEN AND HELLER EHRMAN AND THE SHIFTING 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS TERRAIN 
As pointed out earlier, courts have historically applied the 
unfinished business doctrine to matters billed by the hour.91 
 
winding up of partnership business); Inv’r Assocs. v. Copeland, 546 S.E.2d 431, 436 (Va. 
2001) (stating that “partners owe each other a fiduciary duty in winding up the 
partnership affairs”). But see 6D Farm Corp. v. Carr, 882 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (App. Div. 
2009) (stating that “[t]he ‘fiduciary relation between partners terminates upon notice of 
dissolution, even though the partnership affairs have not been wound up’”) (quoting In re 
Silverberg, 438 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (App. Div. 1981)). The 6D Farm Corp. court’s blanket 
statement is dubious, however, since the court in In re Silverberg, whose opinion the 6D 
Farm Corp. court quoted, was referring only to partners’ post-dissolution ability to 
represent clients who were clients of the firm at the time of dissolution. In re Silverberg, 
438 N.Y.S.2d at 144. Read properly, In re Silverberg expresses only the general rule that 
dissolution erases a partner’s loyalty obligation not to compete with the partnership in 
the conduct of partnership business, but leaves intact other fiduciary duties. The case 
certainly does not support the broad rule that the 6D Farm Corp. court apparently drew 
from it. Accordingly, courts and lawyers should be very wary of relying on the 6D Farm 
Corp. opinion as authority on this issue. 
 85 See In re Rueth Dev. Co., 976 N.E.2d 42, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“Under common 
law, general partners owe each other and the partnership fiduciary duties until final 
termination of the partnership.”); Marr v. Langhoff, 589 A.2d 470, 476 (Md. 1991) (stating 
that partners’ “mutual fiduciary duties cease when the winding up is completed”). 
 86 HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 56, §§ 404(b)(1), (2). 
 87 See id. § 404(d) (“A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the 
other partners . . . consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.”).  
 88 Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678, 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000); Kirsch v. Leventhal, 586 N.Y.S.2d 330, 333 (App. Div. 1992); Smith, Keller & 
Assocs. v. Dorr & Assocs., 875 P.2d 1258, 1267 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Bader v. Cox, 701 
S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. App. 1985)). 
 89 Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See, e.g., Robinson v. Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–6 (D.D.C. 1997) (applying 
District of Columbia law); Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(“[U]nfinished business simply consists of all matters in progress which have not been 
completed at the time the firm is dissolved. . . . That one matter is to be compensated at 
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Courts have reasonably concluded that the unfinished business 
doctrine should apply to all matters within its scope regardless of 
lawyers’ compensation arrangements with clients.92 This 
conclusion is correct because the unfinished business doctrine is 
simply an aspect of partnership law that upholds partners’ 
fiduciary duties to one another and to their firm in the event 
of dissolution.93  
In 2014, however, two cases radically altered the unfinished 
business terrain by rejecting the doctrine’s application to client 
matters that are billed hourly. The New York Court of Appeals 
held in Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)94 that 
“pending hourly fee matters are not ‘partnership property’ or 
‘unfinished business’ within the meaning of New York’s 
Partnership Law.”95 In Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, 
Tremaine LLP,96 a California federal court reasoned that 
California law was “unsettled on the question of whether a law 
firm may assert a property interest in hourly fee matters pending 
at the time of its dissolution,”97 and then held that equity and 
public policy weighed against application of the unfinished 
business doctrine in that context.98 That decision was appealed, 
and the ultimate outcome in Heller Ehrman will now be decided 
by the California Supreme Court on a certified question from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.99 As will be 
explained below, In re Thelen LLP was wrongly decided as a 
matter of partnership law, and Heller Ehrman was wrongly 
decided in the district court. 
A. In re Thelen  
Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)100 arose out 
of the October 2008 dissolution of the law firm Thelen LLP 
(“Thelen”) and the August 2005 dissolution of the venerable law 
firm Coudert Brothers LLP (“Coudert”).101 Both underlying cases 
require some discussion. 
 
an hourly rate and another on a contingency basis is of no consequence in determining 
whether a matter is unfinished business.”) (citation omitted). 
 92 See, e.g., Grossman v. Davis, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 356 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating 
that the Jewel doctrine applies regardless of “the nature of the compensation agreement 
with the client”). 
 93 Rogers, supra note 25, at 336. 
 94 20 N.E.3d 264, 264 (N.Y. 2014). 
 95 Id. at 266–67. 
 96 527 B.R. 24 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 97 Id. at 30. 
 98 Id. at 30–33. 
 99 See infra Part III.B.3. 
 100 20 N.E.3d 264 (N.Y. 2014). 
 101 Id. at 267–69. 
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1. The Underlying Thelen and Coudert Dissolutions and 
Bankruptcy Cases 
First, in connection with Thelen’s dissolution in October 
2008, the firm’s partners adopted a fourth amended partnership 
agreement and a written plan of dissolution.102 The new 
partnership agreement stated that it was governed by California 
law, and unlike prior agreements, included a Jewel or unfinished 
business waiver.103 The waiver provided that: 
Neither the Partners nor the Partnership shall have any claim or 
entitlement to clients, cases or matters ongoing at the time of the 
dissolution of the Partnership other than the entitlement for collection 
of amounts due for work performed by the Partners and other 
Partnership personnel prior to their departure from the Partnership. 
The provisions of this [section] are intended to expressly waive, opt 
out of and be in lieu of any rights any Partner of the Partnership may 
have to “unfinished business” of the Partnership, as the term is 
defined in Jewel v. Boxer . . . or as otherwise might be provided in the 
absence of this provision through the interpretation of the [California 
Uniform Partnership Act of 1994, as amended].104 
Following Thelen’s dissolution, ten former Thelen partners 
joined the New York office of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, and another 
former Thelen partner joined Seyfarth in California.105 They 
brought a number of open matters with them from Thelen.106 
They worked on those matters at Seyfarth and Seyfarth billed 
the clients for their services.107 
In September 2009, Thelen filed for bankruptcy protection in 
the Southern District of New York.108 The bankruptcy trustee, 
Yann Geron, sued Seyfarth to recover the value of Thelen’s 
unfinished business for the bankruptcy estate’s creditors.109 He 
asserted that the open hourly matters the former Thelen 
partners took to Seyfarth were the dissolved firm’s assets, and 
that Thelen’s partners fraudulently transferred those assets to 
individual partners when they adopted the partnership 
agreement with the Jewel waiver on the eve of the 
firm’s dissolution.110 
 
 102 Id. at 267. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. (quoting the partnership agreement). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 267–68. 
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Seyfarth moved for judgment on the pleadings.111 The 
district court granted the motion.112 In holding for Seyfarth, the 
district court (1) determined that New York law controlled the 
dispute; (2) reasoned that under New York law, the unfinished 
business doctrine did not apply to hourly fee matters; and 
(3) concluded that a partnership does not retain a property 
interest in such matters upon dissolution.113 Recognizing the 
gravity of its decision, however, the district court certified its 
order for interlocutory appeal.114 Geron appealed to the Second 
Circuit as expected. 
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that New 
York law controlled the dispute, but further recognized the 
absence of controlling New York authority.115 Given the 
significance of the issues involved, the court reasoned that 
certifying appropriate questions to New York’s highest court for 
determination was preferable to deciding the case based on its 
singular interpretation of New York law.116 The Second Circuit 
therefore certified two questions to the New York Court 
of Appeals: 
Under New York law, is a client matter that is billed on an hourly 
basis the property of a law firm, such that, upon dissolution and in 
related bankruptcy proceedings, the law firm is entitled to the profit 
earned on such matters as the “unfinished business” of the firm? 
If so, how does New York law define a “client matter” for purposes of 
the unfinished business doctrine and what proportion of the profit 
derived from an ongoing hourly matter may the new law 
firm retain?117 
Turning now to Coudert, the firm dissolved in line with the 
terms of its partnership agreement in August 2005.118 On the 
same day they voted to dissolve, the firm’s equity partners 
adopted a special authorization, which authorized the firm’s 
executive board to: 
[T]ake such actions as it may deem necessary and appropriate, 
including, without limitation, the granting of waivers, notwithstanding 
any provisions to the contrary in the Partnership Agreement . . . , in 
order to: 
 
 111 Id. at 268. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See In re Thelen, 736 F.3d 213, 224 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 116 See id. at 223–24. 
 117 Id. at 225. 
 118 In re Thelen, 20 N.E.3d 264, 268 (N.Y. 2014). 
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a. . . . sell all or substantially all of the assets of . . . the Firm to other 
firms or service providers, in order to maximize the value of the 
Firm’s assets and business; 
b. wind down the business of the Firm with a view to continuing the 
provision of legal services to clients and the orderly transition of client 
matters to other firms or service providers, in order to maximize the 
value of the Firm’s assets and business to the extent practicable.119 
Former Coudert partners joined several different law firms, 
taking open matters with them to their new firms.120 They 
completed all but two of those matters at their new firms on an 
hourly basis.121 
In September 2006, Coudert filed for bankruptcy protection 
in the Southern District of New York.122 The administrator of 
Coudert’s estate, Development Specialists, Inc. (“DSI”), brought 
adversary actions against law firms that had hired former 
Coudert partners.123 DSI alleged that the firms were liable to 
Coudert for any profits derived from the matters brought to them 
by the former Coudert partners.124 The law firms moved for 
summary judgment on the basis that the unfinished business 
doctrine did not apply to hourly matters, and DSI cross-moved 
for a declaration that the open client matters were Coudert’s 
property at the time of dissolution.125 The district court sided 
with DSI, and held that the former Coudert partners had to 
account for any profits they earned while winding up the client 
matters at their new firms.126 
The district court certified its decision for immediate appeal 
and, as expected, the law firms appealed.127 The Second Circuit 
then certified to the New York Court of Appeals the same two 
questions asked in In re Thelen.128 
2. The New York Court of Appeals Decision in In re Thelen 
The In re Thelen court began its analysis of Geron’s and 
DSI’s unfinished business claims by noting that the New York 
Partnership Law (the “Partnership Law”) was based on the 
 
 119 Id. at 268–69 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120 Id. at 269. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. (quoting Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 477 
B.R. 318, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d in part, vacated in part, In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 574 
F. App’x 15 (2d Cir. 2014)).  
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. (citing In re Coudert Bros. LLP, Nos. 12-4916(L) et al., 2013 WL 9363394, at 
*1–2 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2013)). 
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UPA.129 It went on to frame the unfinished business doctrine, 
explaining that absent contrary agreement, profits attributable 
to work begun by former partners of a dissolved law firm pre-
dissolution are a partnership asset that must be finished for the 
dissolved firm’s benefit.130 Under the Partnership Law and the 
UPA more generally, “because departing partners owe a fiduciary 
duty to the dissolved firm and their former partners to account 
for benefits obtained from use of partnership property in winding 
up the partnership’s business, they may not be separately 
compensated.”131 But critically, the court noted that the 
Partnership Law does not define partnership property; it sets 
“default rules for how a partnership upon dissolution divides 
property as elsewhere defined” under New York law.132 As a 
result, the In re Thelen court reasoned the Partnership Law does 
not control the determination of whether “a law firm’s ‘client 
matters’ are partnership property.”133 
Continuing, the court explained that in New York, clients 
have the unqualified right to terminate an attorney-client 
relationship at any time with no obligation beyond paying the 
lawyer for the reasonable value of her completed services.134 As a 
result, law firms cannot have property interests in future hourly 
fees because such fees are too uncertain and speculative.135 
Furthermore, prior New York cases on which Geron and DSI 
relied on had “never suggested that a law firm owns anything 
with respect to a client matter other than yet-unpaid 
compensation for legal services already provided.”136 For 
instance, courts applying the unfinished business doctrine to 
contingent fee matters had uniformly held that the dissolved law 
firm could recover only “the ‘value’ of its services.”137 
The In re Thelen court further reasoned that treating a 
dissolved law firm’s open hourly matters as partnership property 
“would have numerous perverse effects,” would offend “basic 
principles that govern the attorney-client relationship,” and 
would violate ethics rules.138 To allow the former partners of a 
dissolved law firm to profit from work they did not perform, at 
 
 129 Id. at 270. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. (quoting In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 135 Id. at 270–71 (quoting Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs., 
Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121, 124 (N.Y. 2013)). 
 136 Id. at 271. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 273. 
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the expense of a former colleague and her new firm, would grant 
them an unjust windfall.139 Furthermore, because the unfinished 
business doctrine does not attach to profits earned on open 
matters that go with former partners who bolt from a struggling 
firm before it dissolves, Geron and DSI’s approach “would 
encourage partners to get out the door, with clients in tow, before 
it is too late, rather than remain and work to bolster the firm’s 
prospects. Obviously, this run-on-the-bank mentality makes the 
turnaround of a struggling firm less likely.”140 Finally, lawyers 
who linger too long at a failing firm are placed in a precarious 
position.141 Faced with the prospect of rebating their fees to their 
former law firm, they might advise their clients that they can no 
longer afford to represent them, which would disrupt the clients’ 
representations and impose a practical restriction on their right 
to choose their own counsel.142 “Or, more likely,” the In re Thelen 
court worried that tardy lawyers would find it hard to obtain 
positions with new law firms because any profits from their work 
for current clients would go to their old firms rather than their 
new ones.143 
Geron and DSI argued that clients do not care which law 
firm their fees go to as long as their matters are handled 
properly.144 The In re Thelen court disagreed based on its prior 
reasoning.145 Additionally, clients might worry that their hourly 
fee matters would be neglected if the new law firm could not 
profit off them.146 The court ridiculed the idea that firms would 
hire partners from dissolved law firms or accept client matters 
without the promise of compensation.147 “Followed to its logical 
conclusion,” the court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ approach 
would hurt clients, lawyers, and law firms without producing the 
desired financial rewards for bankrupt firms’ estates.148 
Ultimately, applying the unfinished business doctrine to hourly 
fee matters would contradict New York’s strong public policy 
favoring client choice and lawyer mobility.149 
Finally, the court rejected Geron and DSI’s argument that a 
law firm can avoid the unfinished business doctrine by inserting 
 
 139 Id. (quoting Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See id. (saying that such a position “ignores commonsense and marketplace realities”). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
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a Jewel waiver in its partnership agreement.150 From the 
court’s perspective: 
This suggestion fails to consider the possibility that classifying clients’ 
pending hourly fee matters as firm property may lead to untoward 
unintended consequences. For example, the trustees . . . limit their 
sought-after recoveries to client matters that remain unresolved as of 
the date of a law firm’s dissolution. As Seyfarth pointed out, though, if 
a client’s pending matter is partnership property, why doesn’t every 
lawyer whose clients follow him to a new firm breach fiduciary duties 
owed his former law firm and partners? In the end, the trustees’ 
theory simply does not comport with our profession’s traditions and 
the commercial realities of the practice of law today, a deficiency 
beyond the capacity of a Jewel waiver to cure.151 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the first certified 
question should be answered negatively.152 It was unnecessary to 
answer the second certified question.153 
3. Analysis 
In re Thelen should perhaps be read as rejecting the UPA’s 
no compensation rule, rather than as a rejecting the unfinished 
business doctrine altogether, since many of the court’s concerns 
about the doctrine’s effects vanish under RUPA, which permits 
reasonable compensation for partners who conclude a dissolved 
law firm’s unfinished business.154 Indeed, the decision should 
have no persuasive force in jurisdictions that have adopted 
RUPA. Even in jurisdictions still glued to the UPA, however, the 
court’s reasoning wilts under scrutiny. Courts writing on a blank 
slate would be justified in disregarding the decision. 
First, the position that future hourly fees are too uncertain 
or speculative to count as partnership property defies logic in 
practice. If those fees were as uncertain as the court reasoned, no 
sensible departing partners would take open matters with them 
to their new firms. No lawyer wants to relocate to a new firm and 
start that relationship on the wrong foot by delivering 
uncollectible client matters. Even collecting a security retainer is 
no protection against a client’s termination of a representation.155 
In reality, the clients that lawyers take with them to new firms 
are almost always reliable payors. Of course, if a lawyer collects 
fees from matters opened at her former firm at her new firm, the 
 
 150 Id. at 274. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.6.3.2, at 4:74–75.  
 155 See Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Retainers and Flat Fees, 34 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 113, 129 (2009) (explaining that security retainers are refundable until earned). 
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fees must be the dissolved partnership’s property because they 
are no longer contingent or speculative in that case.156  
Second, allowing a dissolved law firm to profit from work it 
did not perform at the expense of a former partner and her new 
firm grants the dissolved firm no windfall.157 The former partner 
and her new firm would not have had that matter but for the 
existence and support of the dissolved firm where the matter 
originated. The client originally hitched its star to the dissolved 
firm, not the new firm. 
Third, the argument that because the unfinished business 
doctrine does not attach to profits earned on open matters that go 
with former partners who bolt from a struggling firm before it 
dissolves, enforcement of the doctrine post-dissolution “would 
encourage partners to get out the door, with clients in tow, before 
it is too late, rather than remain and work to bolster the firm’s 
prospects” is at best exaggerated and speculative.158 On the other 
side of the speculation coin, not enforcing the unfinished business 
doctrine might also negatively affect partners’ behavior. For 
example, partners who control key client relationships might 
delay opening new matters for those clients until they have 
relocated their practices, or attempt to account for time spent on 
matters pre-dissolution in ways that will defeat the dissolving 
firm’s right to the associated fees. Besides, other legal principles, 
such as quantum meruit, serve to police opportunistic conduct in 
those circumstances. 
The second part of this argument—the prospect of a trustee 
or receiver enforcing the unfinished business doctrine creates a 
“run-on-the-bank mentality [that] makes the turnaround of a 
struggling firm less likely”159—is equally flawed. A partner run 
typically begins while a firm is profitable, if perhaps not quite as 
profitable as it was in its best years.160 In other words, a partner 
run begins before a firm is “struggling” or requires a 
“turnaround.”161 It begins long before partners perceive the 
unfinished business doctrine as a professional threat. While 
partner runs often cause firms to collapse, their origins are not 
connected to the unfinished business doctrine. 
 
 156 See Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 14 (asserting that fees earned from 
matters open at the time of dissolution are property of the dissolved partnership). 
 157 In re Thelen, 20 N.E.3d at 273 (citing Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 
732, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Morley, supra note 1, at 4. 
 161 See id; In re Thelen, 20 N.E.3d at 273. 
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Fourth, the concern that lawyers will neglect open matters 
they take with them to new firms because of the effect of the 
unfinished business doctrine assumes that those lawyers are 
willing to violate their ethical duties of competence and 
diligence.162 That can’t be right. Furthermore, if a lawyer 
neglects a matter because it is not profitable and the client is 
harmed as a result, the client has adequate remedies in the form 
of causes of action for professional negligence and breach of 
fiduciary duty against the lawyer and her new law firm. More 
important, the true value that a partner brings to the new law 
firm generally is not pending matters, but rather the client 
relationship and expectation of substantial future work from that 
client. Inattention to unfinished work would destroy the real 
asset at issue to the obvious detriment of the lawyers looking to 
transfer the client relationship, as well as to their new law firms. 
Fifth, the rationale that enforcing the unfinished business 
doctrine would limit clients’ right to counsel of their choice is 
deeply flawed. While clients’ right to counsel of their choice is 
certainly important, it has never been unbridled. For instance, a 
court may disqualify a lawyer from representing a client in 
litigation regardless of the client’s interest in retaining that 
lawyer’s services.163 Furthermore, as two commenters have 
explained in the context of law firm dissolutions: 
In the context of a firm dissolution any number of factors may 
preclude a client [from] following one or more attorneys to a new firm. 
There may be a conflict that precludes that engagement from 
transitioning. The new firm may have a fee structure that the client 
finds undesirable. The client may have had an adverse relationship 
with that new firm such that they are not willing to transition their 
files to that firm. For these and any number of other reasons a client 
may either elect not to transfer an engagement to an attorney’s new 
firm or be precluded from doing so. Simply put, a lawyer leaving one 
 
 162 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer 
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the 
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”); id. r. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client.”).  
 163 See Martinez v. Cty. of Antelope, No. 4:15CV3064, 2016 WL 3248241, at *6 (D. 
Neb. June 13, 2016) (“When considering motions to disqualify, courts must balance public 
policy concerns and the court’s responsibility to uphold the integrity of judicial 
proceedings with a party’s right to select his or her own counsel. In determining whether 
to disqualify counsel, a court balances the interests and motivations of the attorneys, the 
clients, and the public.”); Parke v. Cowley Cty., No. 15-1372-JTM-TJJ, 2016 WL 2609610, 
at *2 (D. Kan. May 6, 2016) (“‘The right to counsel of choice is an important one subject to 
override for compelling reasons.’ Even so, this right is secondary in importance to 
preserving the integrity of the judicial process, maintaining the public confidence in the 
legal system and enforcing the ethical standards of professional conduct.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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firm is under no obligation to insure that his or her new firm is 
acceptable to an existing client.164 
Moreover, the concern the In re Thelen court expressed is the 
so-called “lock-out” effect of the unfinished business doctrine; 
that is, enforcing the doctrine supposedly locks-out clients from 
lawyers of their choice.165 Yet, despite the many law firm 
dissolutions to date, lock-out has never been shown to have 
occurred.166 There is no evidence that the phenomenon exists.167 
Additionally, as I have explained elsewhere, “[a]ssuming client 
worthiness, migrating partners should seek to continue clients’ 
representations in order to be hired by those clients in new 
matters. As a general rule, repeat clients face no substantial risk 
of lock-out.”168 
B. The Heller Ehrman Case 
1. The District Court Decision 
The other recent case, Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, 
Tremaine LLP,169 traces back to the September 2008 dissolution 
of the global law firm Heller Ehrman LLP (“Heller”).170 Heller 
was made up of several professional corporations (“PCs”) whose 
lawyer-shareholders served the firm’s clients.171 The PCs voted to 
dissolve the firm pursuant to a written dissolution plan after the 
firm’s largest creditor, Bank of America, declared Heller to be in 
default on the firm’s operational $35 million line of credit and 
 
 164 Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 13. 
 165 See Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law 
Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1597, 
1617–18 (1985). 
 166 Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 13. In Heller Ehrman LLP v. Jones Day (In 
re Heller Ehrman LLP), the record included internal Heller communications in which 
shareholders discussed other law firms’ possible reluctance to employ Heller lawyers and 
staff absent a Jewel waiver. In re Heller Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2013 WL 
951706, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013). For example, one shareholder wrote that 
other firms were “acutely aware of the Jewel v. Boxer problem” and would “want some 
assurance that they won’t get trapped in that net.” Id. To suggest otherwise, he 
speculated, would cause those firms to “simply opt out with no jobs for individuals and 
nothing for the firm.” Id. Of course, none of that private conjecture constitutes evidence 
of lock-out. 
 167 See Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 13 (“[A]s to the argument that clients 
may be, consequent to the Unfinished Business Doctrine, locked out of the counsel they 
desire, it is only that, an argument. With a majority of jurisdictions having to date 
followed Jewel, it would be expected that the cases and commentary would recite 
incidents of lock-out. It is at minimum curious that such a calamitous outcome . . . cannot 
be shown to have ever occurred.”). 
 168 Richmond, supra note 11, at 418. 
 169 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine LLP, 527 B.R. 24 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014).  
 170 Id. at 27. 
 171 Id. 
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seized the firm’s bank accounts.172 Heller’s dissolution plan 
included a Jewel waiver that waived any rights and claims under 
the unfinished business doctrine to fees resulting from hourly fee 
matters open at the time of dissolution.173 Heller filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in December 2008.174 
Heller’s bankruptcy trustee sued Davis, Wright, Tremaine 
LLP (“Davis Wright”) and other law firms to which Heller’s 
lawyers dispersed.175 The trustee alleged that the bankruptcy 
estate was entitled to recover profits from open hourly fee 
matters because the Jewel waiver in the dissolution plan was a 
fraudulent transfer of Heller’s property under either bankruptcy 
code or California law.176 The bankruptcy court granted the 
defendant’s summary judgment.177 The trustee sought review by 
the district court. 
The district court reasoned that it was addressing a question 
of first impression: “whether a law firm—which has been 
dissolved by virtue of creditors terminating their financial 
support, thus rendering it impossible to continue to provide legal 
services in ongoing matters—is entitled to assert a property 
interest in hourly fee matters pending at the time of its 
dissolution.”178 The district court answered this question 
negatively, and started by shredding the trustee’s claim that 
Jewel v. Boxer179 controlled the outcome in this case. 
Jewel is different . . . for five key, related reasons. First, the 
dissolution of the firm . . . in Jewel was voluntary, while Heller’s 
dissolution was forced when Bank of America withdrew the firm’s line 
of credit. This is significant because the partners in Jewel could have, 
but chose not to, finish representing their clients as or on behalf of the 
old firm. Here, Heller lacked the financial ability to continue 
providing legal services to its clients, leaving clients . . . no choice but 
to seek new counsel and Heller [s]hareholders no choice but to seek 
new employment. Second, in Jewel, “[t]he new firms represented the 
clients under fee agreements entered into between the client and the 
old firm.” . . . Here, the clients signed new retainer agreements with 
the new firms. Third, in Jewel, the new firms consisted entirely of 
partners from the old firms. . . . Here, [the] [d]efendants are 
preexisting third-party firms that provided substantively new 
representation, requiring significant resources, personnel, capital, and 
 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Jones Day (In re Heller Ehrman LLP), No. 08-32514DM, 
Adversary No. 10-3221DM, 2013 WL 951706, at *17 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013).  
 178 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 25.  
 179 203 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
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services well beyond the capacity of either Heller or its individual 
[s]hareholders. Where in Jewel, the departed partners continued to 
have fiduciary duties to each other and the old firm, here, the 
third-party firms never owed any duty . . . to the dissolved firm. 
Fourth, Jewel treated hourly fee matters and contingency fee matters 
as indistinguishable. Here, there are no contingency fee cases at issue. 
Finally, Jewel was decided in 1984 and thus applied the Uniform 
Partnership Act . . . which the materially different Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act . . . has since superseded. The RUPA, which applies 
after 1999 to all California partnerships, allows partners to obtain 
“reasonable compensation” for helping to wind up partnership 
business . . . and thus undermines the legal foundation on which 
Jewel rests.180 
The Heller Ehrman court observed that cases applying Jewel 
were poorly reasoned, predated California’s adoption of RUPA, or 
both.181 The California Supreme Court had not addressed the 
unfinished business doctrine in this context.182 Because, in the 
court’s view, California law was unsettled on the issue of a law 
firm’s property interest in hourly fee matters open when it 
dissolved, the court felt free to weigh the equities.183 
The court began its analysis on the “bedrock” idea that 
lawyers expect to be paid for their services and clients expect to 
pay the law firm that employs the lawyers who serve them.184 It 
was therefore easy to conclude that the firms that did the work at 
issue should keep the fees earned from it.185 
The trustee argued that the former Heller shareholders owed 
a fiduciary duty to the firm’s estate to account for profits their 
new firms earned from the former Heller matters.186 But, the 
court noted, the fiduciary duty to account is limited to 
partnership property,187 and the equities did not support the 
recognition of a property interest here.188 As the court explained: 
A law firm never owns its client matters. The client always owns the 
matter, and the most the law firm can be said to have is an 
expectation of future business. . . . [T]he Trustee was unable to 
articulate a basis for calculating the value of this expected future 
business. The Trustee suggested that the value at issue here is “good 
will,” which does not ordinarily appear on law firm balance sheets 
which are on a modified cash basis. In California, and beyond, 
 
 180 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29 (citations omitted). 
 181 Id. at 30. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(b)(1)). 
 188 Id. 
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professional law partnerships do not have a “good will” asset. . . . The 
good will the [t]rustee discussed may be real in one sense: certainly a 
firm’s reputation is a crucial part of its ability to obtain work. 
However, good will is not an asset to which a property interest 
attaches. Moreover, Heller’s bankruptcy did much to undermine the 
firm’s otherwise stellar reputation and to eviscerate any reasonable 
expectation of future business. 
Obviously, the expectation of future business—if it is 
“good will”—would disappear as soon as either (1) the client removes 
business, which it can do at will, or (2) the law firm ceases to be 
able to perform the work to generate those expected future 
profits. . . . Here, the client matters at issue ceased to be Heller’s 
partnership business and became the [d]efendants’ partnership 
business when the clients terminated Heller and retained new, 
third-party counsel.189 
The trustee had conceded in bankruptcy court that the 
departing lawyers’ duty to account for unfinished business was 
attributable solely to Heller’s dissolution.190 This puzzled the 
district court, which saw no reason “why the duties, rights, and 
property interests at stake . . . should be different simply because 
Heller dissolved.”191 If dissolution did alter the equitable terrain, 
it did so in favor of Davis Wright and the other defendant law 
firms.192 Once Heller dissolved, it could no longer represent 
its clients, thereby forcing them to seek alternative 
representation.193 The defendants “came to the rescue of these 
clients” and agreed to represent them in their existing matters.194 
The former Heller clients entered into new retainer agreements 
with the defendants, which “provided substantively new 
representation, requiring significant resources, personnel, 
capital, and services” that dwarfed the capacity of Heller and its 
former shareholders.195 
The court recognized that, as in all bankruptcies, the plight 
of creditors and former employees was “deplorable.”196 
Nonetheless, because the defendant law firms generated the fees 
at issue, the equities supported the retention of those fees.197 
The Heller Ehrman court also reasoned that public policy 
backed the defendant law firms.198 The trustee had argued that 
 
 189 Id. at 30–31 (citations omitted). 
 190 Id. at 31. 
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enforcing the Jewel no compensation rule prevents partners from 
wrestling for the most lucrative cases during the life of the firm 
in the hope of keeping them should the firm dissolve.199 Second, 
the Jewel rule discourages partners from effectively looting the 
firm by soliciting existing clients upon dissolution.200 
Unfortunately for the trustee, neither issue concerned 
the court.201 
Because the profits in question were generated by Davis 
Wright and the other law firms, any incentive the former Heller 
shareholders may have had to game their former firm’s system 
was not squarely at issue.202 Furthermore, the former Heller 
clients chose to engage the defendant law firms, not because any 
shareholders had physical possession of their files, but because 
Heller could no longer represent them.203 
Strangely, the trustee could not even provide a workable 
definition of “winding up” or “unfinished business.”204 The court 
acknowledged that Heller should be paid “for the time its lawyers 
spent filing motions for continuances, noticing parties and courts 
that it was withdrawing as counsel, packing up and shipping 
client files back to the clients or to new counsel, and getting new 
counsel up to speed on pending matters” on the basis that such 
tasks are “what winding up unfinished business entails when a 
firm dissolves in the context of a bankruptcy.”205 The court found 
it incomprehensible that winding up Heller’s affairs might 
encompass litigating matters long after the firm dissolved.206 
“Public policy [could not] favor such an outcome.”207 
Like the In re Thelen court,208 the Heller Ehrman court 
believed that enforcing the unfinished business doctrine would 
perversely “incentivize partners of a struggling firm to jump ship 
at the first sign of trouble to avoid the kind of suit [the] 
[d]efendants now [found] themselves in, even if that would 
destabilize an otherwise viable firm.”209 Recognizing the 
unfinished business doctrine here would further discourage law 
firms from hiring former partners of dissolved firms and from 
accepting new clients formerly represented by lawyers in 
 
 199 Id. (quoting Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (Ct. App. 1984)).  
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. (saying that neither issue was “at play here”). 
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 205 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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 208 Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 20 N.E.3d 264, 273 (N.Y. 2014). 
 209 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 32. 
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dissolved firms.210 The court concluded that it was not in the 
public interest to make it harder for partners leaving a dissolved 
firm to find new jobs or to limit clients’ choice of counsel by 
preventing firms from profiting off the labor and capital 
they expend or invest in matters previously handled by a 
dissolved firm.211  
In the end, the court could not justify recognizing a property 
interest in Heller’s pending hourly matters.212 It thus entered 
summary judgment for the defendants.213 
2. Analysis 
Heller Ehrman is an unfortunate mix of suspect reasoning, 
incomplete analysis, unfounded assumptions, insufficient 
attention to partnership law, and detachment from the reality of 
large law firm practice. District court decisions are never 
precedential,214 but Heller Ehrman is not even persuasive when 
closely analyzed. 
First, in explaining that the former Heller shareholders’ 
fiduciary duty to account to the estate was “limited to 
partnership property” en route to deciding that equity did not 
support recognition of a property interest in unfinished business, 
the court misread the statute on which it relied, California 
Corporations Code § 16404(b)(1).215 This was a fatal error. 
Section 16404(b)(1), which duplicates RUPA § 404(b)(1), extends 
the duty to account well beyond partnership property. Section 
16404(b)(1) states that a partner’s duty of loyalty requires her to 
account for “any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner 
in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or 
derived from a use by the partner of partnership property or 
information, including the appropriation of a partnership 
opportunity.”216 In short, the former Heller shareholders’ duty to 
account to the estate was clearly not limited to partnership 
property, but plainly extended to the profits the trustee was 
seeking to recover. 
 
 210 Id. at 33. 
 211 Id. (citing Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LPP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 223 (2d 
Cir. 2013)). 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 
(D. Mass. 2009) (“As Judges Posner and Easterbrook have repeatedly and accurately 
observed, with characteristic bluntness, district court decisions are neither authoritative 
nor precedential.”). 
 215 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 30 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(b)(1)). 
 216 CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(b)(1) (West 2016) (emphasis added). 
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Second, the court’s efforts at distinguishing Jewel missed the 
mark. The attempt to do so on the basis that the firm’s decision 
to dissolve in Jewel was voluntary and thus the partners could 
have finished their clients’ matters on behalf of the old firm, 
while Heller was forced to dissolve and thus could not continue 
serving clients, was poorly aimed. The UPA and RUPA do not 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary dissolutions. 
While Heller, as an entity, could not continue to represent its 
clients, individual shareholders could—and did. Their doing so at 
new firms is no basis to differentiate Jewel because the partners 
there also represented the former firm’s clients at new firms. To 
say that the Jewel partners, unlike the Heller shareholders, 
could have stayed together through winding up invites the 
argument that the unfinished business doctrine is untenable 
because of the “lock-in” effect—that is, it forces partners to 
remain together in violation of basic freedom of contract 
principles to avoid financial disadvantages that may accompany 
dissolution and winding up.217 
In terms of perverse effects, to distinguish Jewel on the basis 
that the partners in that case continued to represent their former 
firm’s clients under old engagement agreements, while Heller’s 
clients signed new engagement agreements with the firms to 
which the Heller lawyers dispersed, is to allow partners of 
dissolved firms to avoid their fiduciary duties by exalting form 
over substance. That result is neither equitable nor good 
public policy. 
The attempt to discount Jewel on grounds that the partners 
there “continued to have fiduciary duties to each other and the 
old firm,” while the defendants in Heller Ehrman “never owed 
any duty, fiduciary or otherwise, to the dissolved firm,”218 is a 
real head-scratcher. While the defendant law firms did not owe 
any duties to Heller, the former Heller shareholders who moved 
their practices to those law firms certainly did. It is hard to 
understand how the highly-regarded district judge could have 
missed this critical and obvious point. 
Distinguishing Jewel on the basis that the court there 
similarly treated contingent and hourly fees, while in this case 
there were no contingent fees in dispute, is mysterious reasoning 
at best. The Jewel court did not distinguish contingent fees from 
hourly fees, and this case involved hourly fees. The absence of 
disputed contingent fees in Heller Ehrman had nothing to do 
with anything.  
 
 217 Richmond, supra note 11, at 59. 
 218 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29. 
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The only valid basis for distinguishing Jewel was California’s 
subsequent adoption of RUPA. But that did not mean Heller’s 
bankruptcy estate was entitled to no recovery from the law firms; 
rather, the adoption of RUPA simply meant that the estate 
should have recovered less from those firms than it would have if 
the UPA’s no compensation rule had remained California law. 
This is because under RUPA, the defendants were entitled to 
reasonable compensation for their work on the unfinished 
matters at issue. Heller was entitled to recover the difference 
between (a) the amount the clients paid for the work at the new 
law firms, and (b) the reasonable compensation to which those 
firms were entitled for performing the services. 
Third, the court concluded as a matter of equity that the law 
firms “that did the work [in question] should keep the fees,” and 
that because the fees were produced through the defendants’ 
efforts rather than Heller’s, the trustee could not argue that the 
defendants had received a windfall.219 What the court seemingly 
overlooked was RUPA’s allowance of reasonable compensation for 
lawyers’ services in winding up a dissolved firm’s affairs.220 
Surely the allowance of reasonable compensation to the law firms 
for completing Heller’s unfinished business would have alleviated 
the court’s concerns about the law firms performing work for 
which they would not be paid.221 
In the same thread, the district court’s focus on ownership of 
client matters was misplaced.222 Although Heller did not own the 
client matters that departing shareholders took to their new 
firms, it did have an enforceable interest in the fees earned by its 
former shareholders from those matters.223 The Heller Ehrman 
court apparently did not grasp this distinction. And while it is 
true that a client’s termination of its relationship with a former 
Heller lawyer would sever any claim by the bankruptcy estate to 
profits subsequently earned on the client’s matters, the estate 
had an interest in any fees earned before a particular client took 
that step. There had to be a reasonable way to calculate profits 
earned from matters open at the time of Heller’s dissolution, 
apart from the trustee’s odd muttering about good will. The 
court’s related discussion of future new business from former 
Heller clients was hopelessly confused, especially since the 
 
 219 Id. at 30. 
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client always owns the matter, and the most the law firm can be said to have is an 
expectation of future business.”). 
 223 Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 14. 
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unfinished business doctrine does not apply to new matters 
opened post-dissolution. 
Fourth, in weighing the equities, the court’s perception that 
the law firms “came to the rescue” of Heller’s former clients in 
regard to their ongoing matters reflects a basic misunderstanding 
of large law firm practice in general, and of third party law firms’ 
conduct post-dissolution in particular.224 Davis Wright and the 
other excellent law firms involved rescued no one; they accepted 
as clients those former clients of Heller whom or which they 
viewed as profitable and as sources of future business. That was 
perfectly fine—Davis Wright and the other firms were firmly 
within their rights to make those business judgments. But they 
acted out of self-interest. They certainly did not lower rescue 
swimmers or launch lifeboats to bring aboard all former Heller 
clients who might need continued or future representation. They 
left plenty of former Heller clients adrift for later extraction 
by trawlers. 
Fifth, the court’s decision to arbitrarily reconceive or 
redefine winding-up to shorten this phase of a firm’s demise was 
wrong as a matter of partnership law.225 Again, winding up is the 
time after dissolution and before termination during which all 
partnership affairs are settled.226 The fact that it takes longer to 
wind up a law firm’s affairs than it does to wind up another 
business’s affairs is an understandable reason to lament the 
unfinished business doctrine’s application to law firm 
dissolutions, but it does not empower a court to circumscribe this 
phase for the sake of convenience. The court cited no case law, 
statutory authority, or secondary authority for its crabbed view 
of winding-up. 
Sixth, the court overreached when it asserted that applying 
the unfinished business doctrine to hourly fee matters “would 
discourage third-party firms from hiring former partners of 
dissolved firms and discourage third-party firms from accepting 
new clients formerly represented by dissolved firms.”227 In fact, 
law firms want to admit partners from dissolved firms who can 
bring desirable business with them. In most cases, firms are less 
 
 224 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 31.  
 225 Id. at 32 (agreeing “that Heller should bill and be paid for the time its lawyers 
spent filing motions for continuances, noticing parties and courts that it was withdrawing 
as counsel, packing up and shipping client files back to the clients or to new counsel, and 
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winding up unfinished business entails when a firm dissolves in the context of 
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 226 GREGORY, supra note 47, at 368. 
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focused on the open matters that partners bring with them 
(beyond clearing conflicts of interest) than they are in 
establishing a continuing relationship with those clients that will 
yield substantial future business. Negotiating the resolution of 
unfinished business claims is a cost of doing business, and a low 
cost at that. The partners who are in danger of not finding new 
employment when a law firm dissolves are the so-called service 
partners who control no meaningful business. But they are not 
casualties of the unfinished business doctrine; they are victims of 
a law firm culture that generally values technical skill less than 
rainmaking ability. 
As noted in the analysis of In re Thelen, there is no evidence 
that the unfinished business doctrine discourages firms from 
representing former clients of a dissolved firm. If a migratory 
partner’s new firm declines to represent some of her clients from 
her former firm, it is more likely because those clients are not 
viewed as sufficiently profitable, because they do not fit the new 
firm’s practice model in other respects, or because their 
representation would create conflicts of interest with the new 
firm’s existing clients. 
3. The Trustee’s Appeal to the Ninth Circuit  
Heller’s trustee appealed the district court’s decision to the 
Ninth Circuit. After hearing oral argument in June 2016, the 
Ninth Circuit certified this question to the California Supreme 
Court in July 2016: “Under California law, does a dissolved law 
firm have a property interest in legal matters that are in 
progress but not completed at the time the law firm is dissolved, 
when the dissolved law firm had been retained to handle the 
matters on an hourly basis?”228 The California Supreme Court’s 
decision will determine the outcome of the case.229 
At the time this article was submitted, the California 
Supreme Court had only recently accepted the case on referral 
from the Ninth Circuit, in the process restating the certified 
question to ask: “Under California law, what interest, if any, does 
a dissolved law firm have in legal matters that are in progress 
but not completed at the time the law firm is dissolved, when the 
dissolved law firm had been retained to handle the matter on an 
hourly basis?”230 In restating the question as it did, the court 
appears to have left the focus of the inquiry on the dissolved law 
 
 228 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP (In re Heller Ehrman LLP), 
830 F.3d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 229 Id. at 973. 
 230 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, No. S236208, 2016 Cal. 
LEXIS 7131, at *1 (Cal. Aug. 31, 2016).  
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firm rather than on the obligations of the partners or 
shareholders of the dissolved firm, which is where the focus 
should be. This is one of the places where the district court in 
Heller Ehrman became confused. Again, it is critical to recall that 
the former Heller shareholders who relocated their practices to 
the defendant law firms continued to owe duties to each other 
and to Heller. To the extent the defendant law firms believe that 
focusing on the individual shareholders penalizes them for 
finishing Heller’s business, they need to reconsider. Under 
RUPA, which California adopted after Jewel, they are entitled to 
reasonable compensation for their work on unfinished matters. 
It is difficult to criticize the California Supreme Court before 
it even hears the case, but the question presented might have 
been better restated along these lines: Must shareholders or 
partners of a dissolved law firm who transfer hourly matters that 
were open at the time of dissolution from their former law firm to 
a new law firm account to their former firm for the profits earned 
on those matters consistent with their obligation to wind up the 
dissolved firm’s affairs? Restating the question that way clearly 
would have focused attention on the obligations of the former 
Heller shareholders. 
IV. RECOGNIZING THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS DOCTRINE 
The unfinished business doctrine is imperfect. It is a nagging 
inconvenience for law firms. It potentially produces results in 
some cases that perhaps are not “the most equitable or logical.”231 
This is particularly true in jurisdictions that follow the UPA and 
consequently prohibit partners from receiving extra 
compensation for their efforts in winding up partnership 
affairs.232 This is the strict Jewel rule, or the “no compensation” 
rule.233 Fortunately, the seeming unfairness of the ban on extra 
compensation for time spent on winding up partnership affairs 
that was enforced in Jewel is cured in states that have adopted 
RUPA, and therefore permit lawyers who perform legal services 
in the wind-up to receive reasonable compensation for 
their efforts.234 
At base, the unfinished business doctrine prioritizes 
partners’ fiduciary duties to one another and the dissolved 
 
 231 Sufrin v. Hosier, 896 F. Supp. 766, 770 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 232 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1914) 
(“No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business, except 
that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in winding 
up the partnership affairs.”). 
 233 Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 234 See supra Part II.A.  
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partnership over other competing considerations.235 It is on these 
duties that courts must focus. Courts should appreciate the 
importance of fiduciary duties between partners and between 
partners and their firms, and they ought to recognize the value in 
upholding those duties at times when relationships between 
partners are tested. To the extent the unfinished business 
doctrine further emphasizes the financial interests of creditors of 
the dissolved law firm over those of the firms to which the 
partners of the dissolved firm relocate, that is a simple 
policy choice. 
The unfinished business doctrine is an established aspect of 
partnership law that applies to all businesses organized as 
partnerships, including professional practices. Why should law 
firms be treated differently from other partnerships in connection 
with matters where they bill by the hour? There is no good 
answer to this question.236 The recycled argument that the 
unfinished business doctrine is unworthy of enforcement because 
it impairs client choice does not hold water. 
Lawyers making this argument contend that applying the 
unfinished business doctrine to matters billed by the hour creates 
a financial disincentive for the former partners of a dissolved 
firm to continue representing their clients when they transition 
to their new firms.237 That is, when a partner realizes that she 
and her new colleagues will have to perform all of the ongoing 
work but will have to remit a material share of the associated 
fees to her former firm, she will opt to terminate the 
representation even though the client may want her to 
continue.238 But as explained earlier, the true value that a 
partner brings to her new law firm generally is not pending 
matters in their own right, but the client relationship and the 
expectation of significant future matters from that client. 
Withdrawal from current matters out of frustration with the 
unfinished business doctrine would destroy the real asset at 
issue to the detriment of the lawyers and their new law firms. It 
is almost certainly for this reason that this claimed risk has 
never been shown to have occurred.239 
 
 235 Sufrin, 896 F. Supp. at 770. 
 236 The unfinished business doctrine certainly applies to contingent fee matters. See, 
e.g., Santalucia v. Sebright Transp., Inc., 232 F.3d 293, 297–98 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Shandell v. Katz, 629 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (App. Div. 1995)). Indeed, lawyers generally 
accept the doctrine’s application in that context. 
 237 Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP, 480 B.R. 145, 
170 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d in part, vacated in part, In re Coudert Bros., 574 F. App’x 15 
(2d Cir. 2014). 
 238 Id. 
 239 Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 13.  
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Not surprisingly, courts presented with client choice 
arguments have repeatedly rejected them.240 Some courts have 
specifically noted the speculative “sky is falling” nature of these 
arguments.241 As the Colorado Supreme Court aptly observed in 
LaFond v. Sweeney,242 “[h]ypothetical harm, as opposed to actual 
harm to the client’s ability to choose counsel in [a] case, is not a 
pertinent consideration when determining the rights and 
obligations of attorneys to their firms.”243 
For that matter, a variety of factors may deter or prevent a 
client from following a lawyer from a dissolving firm to another 
firm.244 A conflict of interest may prevent the lawyer from 
representing the client at the second firm, or the client may find 
the second firm’s fee structure unacceptable and therefore seek 
different representation.245 Lawyers who depart dissolving law 
firms for new firms have no obligation to ensure that their new 
firms are acceptable to their existing clients.246 
Another common argument against the unfinished business 
doctrine in the law firm context asserts that because clients are 
not property and belong to no lawyer247 and can discharge their 
lawyers at any time for any reason or for no reason at all,248 their 
open matters cannot fairly be characterized as property of the 
dissolved firm. But this argument is unsupportable. First, it 
ignores the fact that the subject clients had not discharged the 
 
 240 See, e.g., Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he right of 
a client to the attorney of one’s choice and the rights and duties as between partners with 
respect to income from unfinished business are distinct and do not offend one another. 
Once the client’s fee is paid to an attorney, it is of no concern to the client how that fee is 
allocated among the attorney and his or her former partners.”); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 
N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“This right of the client is distinct from and does not 
conflict with the rights and duties of the partners between themselves with respect to 
profits from unfinished partnership business because since, once the fee is paid to an 
attorney, it is of no concern to the client how the fee is distributed among the attorney 
and his partners.”). 
 241 See, e.g., In re LaBrum & Doak, LLP, 227 B.R. 391, 409 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) 
(“Although the Defendants bluster about the allegedly disastrous public policy of such 
principles, they are unable to cite any cases from any jurisdictions regarding law firms to 
the contrary.”). 
 242 LaFond v. Sweeney, 343 P.3d 939 (Colo. 2013).  
 243 Id. at 947. 
 244 Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 13. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 See Phil Watson, P.C. v. Peterson, 650 N.W.2d 562, 565 n.1 (Iowa 2002) (“[C]lients 
do not ‘belong’ to [a] firm or its individual members . . . .”); Shamberg, Johnson 
& Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver, 220 P.3d 333, 341 (Kan. 2009) (“A client is not an article of 
property in which a lawyer can claim a proprietary interest, which he can sell to other 
lawyers expecting to be compensated for the loss of a property right.”) (quoting Palmer 
v. Breyfogle, 535 P.2d 955, 966 (Kan. 1975)). 
 248 Nabi v. Sells, 892 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (App. Div. 2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.16 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
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dissolved firm and, indeed, followed their lawyers to their new 
firms. Second, although the dissolved law firm may not have an 
enforceable property interest in the client’s matter, it does have 
an enforceable property interest in the proceeds from its lawyers’ 
work.249 In undertaking work for a client, a partner commits that 
those fees will flow to the firm and be shared among the partners 
according to the partnership agreement, or in the absence of a 
partnership agreement, pursuant to the jurisdiction’s partnership 
law.250 Third, the new law firms wanted the dissolved law firm’s 
partners to join them precisely because they would transfer their 
clients. The relocating lawyers surely promoted their client 
relationships when negotiating their moves to their new firms. 
The lawyers and their new firms cannot fairly disclaim the 
unfinished business doctrine on client choice principles even as 
they are counting on client loyalty to obtain financial benefits. 
The best argument against the unfinished business doctrine 
is that it must not be worth enforcing because it can be so easily 
waived. Phrased as a question, if a law firm can circumvent the 
unfinished business doctrine simply by inserting a Jewel waiver 
in its partnership agreement, what value is there in enforcing the 
doctrine in the absence of such a waiver? The answer, it would 
seem, is either “none” or “not much.” 
As sensible and appealing as this argument is, it is unlikely 
to carry the day. The trouble is its flipside: a law firm is a 
sophisticated organization with the ability to avoid the 
unfinished business doctrine by drafting its partnership 
agreement accordingly. A treatise on law firm partnerships even 
offers a sample Jewel waiver for lawyers to use when drafting or 
amending their partnership agreements.251 In short, a firm that 
chooses not to include a Jewel waiver in its partnership 
agreement effectively consents to governance at dissolution by 
default partnership law and thus submits to application of the 
unfinished business doctrine.252 Furthermore, the unfinished 
business doctrine’s status as a default rule does not make it 
undeserving of recognition or enforcement. If that were the case, 
every jurisdiction would have to abandon its partnership 
statutes. After all, the UPA and RUPA primarily set 
default rules.253 
 
 249 Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 14. 
 250 Id. (citing Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)). 
 251 CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 41, § 6.03[7], at 6-40.4. 
 252 See Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 9.  
 253 Husch & Eppenberger, LLC v. Eisenberg, 213 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2006); McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697, 703 (Mont. 2004); Ederer v. Gursky, 881 N.E.2d 
204, 212 (N.Y. 2007); Bushard v. Reisman, 800 N.W.2d 373, 381 (Wis. 2011); see, e.g., 
HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 56, § 103(a) (“To the extent the 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Law firm failures are disturbingly common. Even brand 
name law firms collapse with odd frequency. Regardless of the 
particular firm or reasons for dissolution, failed law firms 
typically have open client matters. This triggers application of 
the unfinished business doctrine, which is an entrenched aspect 
of partnership law. Under the unfinished business doctrine, 
absent an agreement to the contrary, partners have a duty to 
account to the dissolved firm and their former partners for either 
all fees or profits generated from work in progress at the time of 
the firm’s dissolution in accordance with their percentage 
interests in the dissolved firm. 
For years, courts have applied the unfinished business 
doctrine to all client matters, including those billed by the hour. 
There seemed to be no doubt that the unfinished business 
doctrine applied to hourly matters just as it did to contingent fee 
cases. Then, in 2014, two courts upset the applecart when they 
rejected the doctrine’s application to client matters that are billed 
hourly. In Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP),254 
New York’s highest court held that “pending hourly fee matters 
are not partnership ‘property’ or ‘unfinished business’ within the 
meaning of New York’s Partnership Law.”255 In Heller Ehrman 
LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine LLP,256 a California federal court 
reasoned that California law was “unsettled on the question of 
whether a law firm may assert a property interest in hourly fee 
matters pending at the time of its dissolution,”257 and held that 
equity and public policy weighed against recognition of the 
unfinished business doctrine in that context.258 The losing 
bankruptcy trustee appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the case 
has now reached the California Supreme Court on a certified 
question from the Ninth Circuit. The California Supreme Court’s 
decision will determine the outcome in Heller Ehrman. 
In re Thelen and Heller Ehrman were wrongly decided. The 
principal arguments against the unfinished business doctrine 
that have been made to date are unpersuasive. But if the 
California Supreme Court holding compels the Ninth Circuit to 
affirm the district court’s decision in Heller Ehrman, it will be 
fair to wonder whether the unfinished business doctrine will 
 
partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the 
partners and between the partners and the partnership.”). 
 254 20 N.E.3d 264 (N.Y. 2014).  
 255 Id. at 266–67. 
 256 527 B.R. 24 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 257 Id. at 30. 
 258 Id. at 30–33. 
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survive in jurisdictions other than California and New York. It is 
hard to have any confidence that other courts will reject the 
reasoning of courts as influential as the New York Court of 
Appeals and the California Supreme Court, regardless of the 
strength of any contrary arguments. 
None of this is to say that the unfinished business doctrine is 
perfect or that it does not yield results in some cases that appear 
unfair to the lawyers involved. But the unfinished business 
doctrine is a default rule that lawyers can contract around. And 
whatever unfairness lawyers claim is arguably matched by the 
unfairness that creditors of the dissolved law firm will feel if the 
doctrine is abrogated in the hourly fee context. Insofar as law 
firms that hire lawyers from dissolved law firms go, operation of 
the unfinished business doctrine is simply a cost of doing 
business. If they want the client relationships that relocating 
lawyers are able to deliver, they need to be prepared to either 
(a) share the fees generated by open matters that are transferred 
to them; or (b) negotiate some preferable resolution with the 
dissolved firm’s administrator or trustee. Recent experience 
teaches that law firms can settle unfinished business claims for 
pennies on the dollar. 
In contrast, abrogating the unfinished business doctrine in 
connection with law firms’ hourly representations may come at a 
cost. For example, it is fair to worry that courts’ rejection of the 
doctrine may lessen some companies’ willingness to do business 
with law firms or will cause them to insist on terms that are 
disadvantageous to law firms. More broadly, exempting law firms 
from the doctrine’s operation in connection with matters billed by 
the hour risks creating the impression that courts are favoring 
lawyers over other partnerships that remain subject to the 
doctrine.259 The appearance of such self-interest is potentially 
corrosive to the legal profession. 
In conclusion, partnership law requires courts to apply the 
unfinished business doctrine to client matters that law firms bill 
by the hour. The California Supreme Court in Heller Ehrman 
should so hold to be consistent with the state’s lower appellate 
courts that have long done so. This is the correct result as a 
matter of partnership law, even if it is unpopular with lawyers 
and law firms. 
 
 259 See generally Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of 
the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 454–55 (2008) (stating the hypothesis, later 
said to be established, that “if there is a clear advantage or disadvantage to the legal 
profession in any given question of law, the cases are easy to predict: judges will choose 
the route (within the bounds of precedent and seemliness) that benefits the profession as 
a whole”). 
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